Postdoctoral Associate
CSAP/ISPS
Yale University
scott.bokemper@yale.edu
Curriculum Vitae

Background

2017- Postdoctoral Associate, Center for the Study of American Politics, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University
2012-2017 PhD, Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University
2008-2012 B.A., Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Research

My research uses experimental methods to how institutions and human psychology jointly shape political behavior. Particularly, I design and program novel economic games to examine the contours of social insurance policy, beneficiary behavior, and program support. I have also used survey experiments to study how people believe collective decisions should be made. More generally, I have a number of projects that relate to institutions and political behavior. You can find more information about my research, teaching, and experimental games below.

Publications

DeScioli, P., & Bokemper, S.E. (forthcoming). Intuitive political theory: People’s judgments about how groups should decide. Political Psychology.
[draft]

DeScioli, P., Cho, B., Bokemper, S.E. & Delton, A.W., (forthcoming). Selfish and cooperative voting: Can the majority restrain themselves? Political Behavior [draft]

Miller, R. A., & Bokemper, S.E. (2016). Media coverage and escalation of militarized interstate disputes, 1992-2001. Media, War, and Conflict, 9, 162-179. [pdf]

DeScioli, P., & Bokemper, S. (2014). Voting as a counter-strategy in the blame game. Psychological Inquiry, 25, 206-214. [pdf]

Dawes, C.T., Loewen, P.J., Schreiber, D., Simmons, A.N., Flagan, T., McElreath, R., Bokemper, S.E., Fowler, J.H., & Paulus, M.P. (2012). Neural basis of egalitarian behavior, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109, 17, 6479-6483. [pdf]

Work in Progress

Bokemper, S.E., DeScioli, P., & Kline, R., (R&R at Journal of Experimental Political Science). Unfair rules for unequal pay: Wage discrimination and procedural justice. [draft]

Bokemper, S.E., Fang, A.H., & Huber, G.A., (under review). Perceptions of program abuse and support for social insurance [draft] [appendix]

Bokemper, S.E., & DeScioli, P., (in prep). The problem of dishonesty in government safety nets. [draft]

Bor, A., Mazepus, H., Bokemper, S.E., & DeScioli, P. (in prep). When should the majority rule? Experimental evidence for Madisonian judgments in five cultures. [draft]

Grants and Awards

Charles Koch Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship ($155,000)

International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics, Small Grants Program (2016). With Peter DeScioli. "Experiments on social safety nets". ($8,400).

National Science Foundation funded participant at 5th Lindau Nobel Laureate Meeting on Economic Sciences. August, 2014

Stony Brook University, Dorothy L. Pieper Award for excellent academic performance and potential

Conference Presentations

Bokemper, S.E., & DeScioli, P. (2018, June). An experiment on dishonesty and support for social insurance. At the Center for the Study of American Politics conference, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

Bokemper, S.E., Fang, A.H., & Huber, G.A. (2018, May). Experiments on the political economy of disability insurance. At Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY.

Bokemper, S.E., & DeScioli, P. (2018, April). The problem of honesty in government safety nets. At the Midwest Political Science Association meeting, Chicago, IL.

Bor, A., Mazepus, H., Bokemper, S.E., & DeScioli, P. (2018, April). When should the majority rule? Experimental evidence for Madisonian judgments in five cultures. At the Midwest Political Science Association meeting, Chicago, IL.

Bokemper, S.E., Fang, A.H., & Huber, G.A. (2018, January). Experiments on the political economy of disability insurance. At Yale University, New Haven, CT.

Bokemper, S.E., & DeScioli, P. (2018, October). The problem of honesty in government safety nets. At Creighton University, Omaha, NE.

Bokemper, S.E., & DeScioli, P. (2018, October). The problem of honesty in govnerment safety nets. At the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE.

DeScioli, P., Cho, B., Bokemper, S. E., & Delton, A. W. (2017, September). Selfish and cooperative voting: Can the majority restrain themselves? At the American Political Science Association meeting, San Francisco, CA.

DeScioli, P., Cho, B., Bokemper, S. E., & Delton, A. W. (2017, April). Selfish and cooperative voting: Can the majority restrain themselves? At the New York Area Political Psychology Meeting, Columbia University, New York, New York.

Bokemper, S.E., & DeScioli, P. (2016, Sept). Experiments on social safety nets. At American Political Science Association Meeting, Philidelphia, PA.

Bokemper, S., & DeScioli, P. (2016, May). Experiments on social safety nets. Poster presented at the Behavioral Models of Politics Conference 2016, Pittsburgh, PA.

Kline, R., Bokemper, S.E., & DeScioli, P. (2014, September). Procedural fairness, cooperation, and trust: An experimental analysis. At the American Political Science Association meeting, Washington, D.C.

Bokemper, S.E., Velez, Y.R., Lodge, M.G., & Kraft, P. (2014, April). Mapping the meanings of political concepts. At the Midwest Political Science Association meeting, Chicago, IL.

Velez, Y.R., Seltzer, N.A., Lown, P., & Bokemper, S.E. (2013, April). On the origins of authoritarianism. At the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL.

Miller, R. A., & Bokemper, S.E. (2012, April). Somebody spoke, nobody heard: Audience costs, crisis visibility, and international conflict. At the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL.

Teaching

Introduction to American Politics (Fall 2015, Spring 2016, Fall 2016, Spring 2017)

Professional Affiliations

American Political Science Association
Midwest Political Science Association

Games

I design and program novel incentivized games using web based programming tools. You can find demo versions of software below.

Unemployment Game Peer Version[html]

Unemployment Game Public Fund Version[html]

SSDI Game [coming soon]

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